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Abstract 
What is the relation between globalization and the process of European integration? Does the 
European integration have its own way, or is it deeply dependent on globalization? Those are the 
main questions I will try to answer in this paper by using an alternative critical approach: neo-
gramscianism. Neo-gramscianism is a historical materialist view on the European integration process 
and international political economy which offers a better understanding of the social changes in terms 
of social forces agency and super structural influence (the neoliberal ideology of globalization and 
European integration). 
My  aim  is  to  analyze  the  globalization  process  through  a  neo-gramscian  theoretical 
framework and to observe how its main components affect European Integration. I will do this by 
assuming the definition of globalization provided by Andreas Bieler, who understands this process 
through three main pillars: transnationalization of finance, transnationalization of production and 
ideological shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. Finally I will try to formulate some conclusions 
regarding the emergence of European Round Table of Industrialists – the first lobby group of big 
capital at the European Union level – and Economic and Monetary Union – the internal market 
program that symbolizes the shift to neo-liberalism. 
Keywords: Globalization, European Integration, Critical Theory, Neo-gramscianism, 
Social Forces. 
1. Introduction 
Globalisation is one of the most used terms for the economic, social and political 
changes that are specific for the end of XX century and the beginning of the XXI. A very 
general  definition  of  this  concept  refers  “to  a  set  of  processes  that  have  increased 
interconnectedness across the globe, and where, crucially, these connections in many respects 
transcend  the  narrow  boundaries  of  the  nation-state”  (Kiely  2005,  1).  In  this  way, 
globalisation gives rise to new challenges for the nation state that is more and more pressed to 
collaborate with others instead of choosing armed force
1. 
My critical approach instead, will try to understand globalisation from both material 
and ideological point of view. The classical Marxist interpretation of this process is mainly 
based on the development of the relations of production. Paul Wetherly states that Karl Marx 
is one of the first theorists of globalisation because he observed in The Communist Manifesto 
the  bourgeoisie’s  tendency  to  expand  all  over  the  world  in  the  search  for  profit
2.  Thus 
capitalism appears like a global system which can overturn the cultural and physical borders 
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1 “This was linked not only to the end of the Cold War, but also to the idea that there are genuinely global problems that 
require cooperation between states, which saw the rise of various institutions of multilateral global governance, and the 
emergence  of  a  transnational  civil  society,  in  which  global,  non-state  actors  could  put  pressure  on  nation-states  and 
international institutions in order to facilitate ‘global justice’” (Kiely 2005, 2). 
2 For more details see Wetherly, Paul.  Marxism and the State. An Analytical Approach. Palgrave Macmillan. New York: 
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through the price system: “The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with 
which  it  batters  down  all  Chinese  walls,  with  which  it  forces  the  barbarians'  intensely 
obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to 
adopt  the  bourgeois  mode  of  production;  it  compels  them  to  introduce  what  it  calls 
civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves” (Marx and Engels 1948, 
13). Consequently, capitalism has a progressive impact on the world because it develops the 
productive forces and increases the number of proletariat. In this way, “capitalism created its 
own gravedigger because the working class would, through its cooperative and unifying role 
in the process of production, eventually overthrow capitalism and create a society (socialism) 
in which everybody lived off the social surplus product. This process would occur globally, as 
what we would now call a transnational capitalist class exploited a transnational proletariat, 
and so  nation-states  and national  differences  would  gradually be eroded by  the dynamic, 
expansionary but exploitative nature of capitalism” (Kiely 2005, 58). 
But the foreseen revolution didn’t happen even after the death of Marx, and other 
thinkers started to look for theoretical gaps in Marxism, or to give an original interpretation to 
it. One of the most important thinkers is Antonio Gramsci who, analysing the Italian situation, 
believed that the revolution was delayed because of some ideological aspects. The working 
class consciousness was filled with bourgeois values until it was convinced that this reality is 
the only possible reality. Here is where I fit my research and my analysis of globalisation: 
between  the  mutual  influence  of  base  (social  relation  of  production)  and  superstructure 
(ideological aspects). The Magnus Ryner definition captures this point of view focusing on 
ideology (crisis of Keynesian state) and on the relation of production (transnationalisation of 
production): “At the present the term globalization is often used, and the ‘crisis of the welfare 
state’ is almost as often associated with it.at the same time, the term is rarely defined, or it is 
used in a frustratingly vague way. On a descriptive level it is generally associated with the 
breakdown of communication bottlenecks and a transnationalisation of economic activities, 
such  as  trade,  investment  and  production.  In  more  systematic  studies,  the  issue  is  often 
reduced to a quantitative one, where trans-border transactions are measured” (Ryner 2002, 
100).  Furthermore,  I  will  develop  this  point  of  view  to  generate  a  more  complex 
understanding of globalisation. 
Until this, I will introduce the main concepts I am going to use, outlining the neo-
gramscian approach
3 of explaining European Integration. Thus, the integration process is seen 
as the output of the activity of both structure (relations of production) and superstructure 
(impact of neoliberal ideology). Summarily, a neo -gramscian analysis will focus on the 
existence of a historical bloc that could achieve or not hegemonic level. Moreover, the engine 
of social changes is considered to be the agency of social forces and implicitly the class 
struggle. 
The most important aspect of neo -gramscianism is represented by its focusing on 
social forces engendered by the production process and understood as the most important 
collective actor. „Consequently, various fractions of labour and capital may be identified in 
relation  to  their  place  in  the  production  system.  This  makes  structural  changes  such  as 
globalisation  accessible,  since  the  emergence  of  new  social  forces  engendered  by  the 
transnationalisation  of  production  and  finance  can  be  incorporated”  (Bieler,  Andreas  and 
Adam David Morton. Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political 
Economy and the Relevance to European Integration in Bieler and Morton 2001, 17). Those 
social forces, being engendered by the production process, are related with social classes in 
classical Marxist theory. Social classes are therefore regarded as social forces whose cohesion 
derives from its role in the production process. „Consequently, class is defined as a relation 
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and the various fractions of labour and capital can be identified by relating them to their place 
in the production system” (Bieler 2000, 10). 
To further explore the nature of social forces, Bieler and Morton make the following 
distinctions:  (1)  national  social  forces  -  are  derived  from  national  production  sectors;  (2) 
transnational social  forces  –  transnational  forces  of capital  and labour  engendered by the 
process of transnational production. Moreover,  „the first group can be further sub-divided 
into  nationally-oriented  capital  and  labour,  which  stem  from  domestic  production  sectors 
which  produce  for  the  national  market,  and  internationally-oriented  capital  and  labour, 
engendered  by  domestic  production  sectors,  which  produce  for  the  international  market” 
(Bieler,  Andreas  and  Adam  David  Morton.  Introduction:  Neo-Gramscian  Perspectives  in 
International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration in Bieler and 
Morton  2001,  17).  I  would  like  to  state  that,  however,  considering  the  economical 
characteristics of the XXI century, it becomes difficult to imagine an exclusively national type 
of capitalism which has absolutely no connection with global production. Thus, we cannot 
talk about an exclusively national capital, but  we can talk instead about forms of capital 
interested by national protectionism, which are not able to compete on global market because 
they would not survive. 
Furthermore,  because  this  research  belongs  to  a  neo-gramscian  approach,  it  will 
consequently emphasise the independent role of ideas. Firstly, those ideas are part of a social 
structure as intersubjective meanings and, as Robert Cox suggest, the individuals or groups of 
individuals  become  aware  of  their  social  condition  and  about  possibilities  of  change. 
Secondly, „ideas may be used by actors as ‘weapons’ in order to legitimise particular policies 
and are important in that they form part of a hegemonic project by organic intellectuals” 
(Bieler 2000, 13). Thus, I will discuss further to what extent the concepts of historical bloc 
and hegemony will help me to explain the process of European integration. 
One of the most important elements of the neo-gramscian theory is represented by the 
concept of historical bloc. „At a basic level of understanding, a historical bloc is an alliance of 
classes or fractions of classes, which attempts to establish a particular form of state and/or 
world order preferable to them. Nevertheless, a historical bloc is more than a simple alliance 
of  social  forces”  (Bieler  2000,  14).  This  concept  involves  a  unity  between  structure  and 
superstructure forming a complex dynamic of social forces which include economic, political 
and cultural aspects. „Various social forces may attempt to do this by forming an historical 
bloc to establish preferable forms of governance at the national, European and/or international 
level” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives 
in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration in Bieler and 
Morton 2001, 20). 
Another important aspect of neo-gramscianism is the concept of hegemony
4. This is a 
form  of  leadership  which  is  more  likely  characterized  by  consent  than  coercion. 
„Additionally,  a  hegemonic  order  is  based  on  a  historical  bloc  that  does  not  necessarily 
coincide with the boundaries of a state, but may be established at a transnational level” (Bieler 
2000, 14). From another perspective, hegemony could be seen as a form of social leadership: 
„Ideas are essential for constituting political coalitions. They constitute or define interests of 
social groups. At the same time, they may also seek to legitimate these interests vis-￠-vis 
other social groups. Thus ideational practice is an important element of constituting social 
leadership”  (Drahokoupil,  Jan,  Bastiaan  van  Apeldoorn  and  Laura  Horn.    Introduction: 
Towards  a  Critical  Political  Economy  of  European  Governance  in  van  Apeldoorn, 
Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 9). To achieve those things, the hegemony should not contain 
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only  the  interests  of  the  dominant  social  group,  but  it  should  also  incorporate  “other 
(opposing)  interests  into  the  hegemonic  world  view  and  thus  transcending  the  narrow 
selfinterests  of  the  leading  group”  (Drahokoupil,  Jan,  Bastiaan  van  Apeldoorn  and  Laura 
Horn. Introduction: Towards a Critical Political Economy of European Governance in van 
Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 9). 
Considering the situation of nowadays European Union, some scholars like Bastiaan 
van  Apeldoorn,  Stephen  Gill
5  or  Dorothee  Bhole
6  are  discussing  the  superstructural 
dimension of European Integration in terms of neoliberal hegemony. The most important here 
is van Apeldoorn who states that the European project is neoliberal because it “aimed at the 
restoration and expansion of capitalist class power through an ideological commitment to the 
freedom of market exchange and to the absolute exercise of capitalist property rights, it was 
particularly within the European context that the new neoliberal policy paradigm had to adjust 
to  the  persisting  traditions  of  corporatist  industrial  relations  (‘social  partnership’)”  (van 
Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. “The Contradictions of ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’ and Europe’s Multi-
level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits” in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil 
and Horn 2009, 9). Also, regarding the social and industrial protection offered by the state 
intervention,  Apeldoorn  uses  the  term  ‘embeddedness’.  In  consequence,  embedded 
neoliberalism  encompasses  former  neo-mercantilists,  the  European  labour  movement,  and 
social-democratic political forces. 
To conclude, European integration is seen and analysed from two perspectives: the 
first one is the social forces agency which can explain also the process of globalization by 
considering the lobby activity of transnational social forces; and the second one is analysing 
the ideological dimension of European integration – which is known today as the neoliberal 
project. Thus, using a neo-gramscian approach, globalisation is seen as a central pillar in 
understanding  the  integration  process.  To  see  how  exactly  it  has  affected  European 
integration, in the next chapter I am going to provide a deep explanation of the components of 
globalisation. 
2. Content 
2.1. Neo-gramscian view on globalization 
In this section I will understand globalization from a political economy perspective. 
Thus,  I  will  follow  Andreas  Bieler  who  state  that  globalisation  is  “characterised  by  two 
interlinked processes, the transnationalisation of finance and production at the material level, 
and a shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the ideological level
7” (Bieler 2000, 19). 
With an accent on both, economic and ideological processes (structural and super-structural in 
Marxist terms) this approach is encompassed in the neo-gramscian research area. The changes 
on  material  level  could  not  take  the  shape  of  nowadays  globalisation  without  a  strong 
ideological principle like the free market or minimal state intervention.  
                                                 
5 Stephen Gill states that it is not the moment to talk about a neoliberal hegemony, but one can identify a supremacy of 
neoliberalism. For more details see Gill, S. (2003) “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to European Integration” in Cafruny, A.W. 
and Ryner M. “A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
New York, p 47-71. 
6 For more details see Bohle, Dorothee, “Neoliberal Hegemony, Transnational Capital and the Terms of EU’s Eastwards 
Expansion”, Capital and Class, Issue 85, 2006, 57-86. 
7 Andreas Bieler’s perspective on globalization is inspired from Robert Cox who refers to globalisation in two principal 
aspects: “(1) global organisations of production (complex transnational networks of pro duction which source the various 
components of the product in places offering the most advantage on costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labour, and 
also the advantages of political security and predictability); and (2) global finance (a very largely unregulated system of 
transactions in money, credit, and equities)” (Cox, Robert. Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe 
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2.1.1. Transnationalization of finance 
The first characteristic of globalization, as it was defined by the Andreas Bieler and 
Robert Cox, is the transnationalisation of finance. The elements that constitute it are, on the 
one hand, the emergence of offshore markets and deregulation process, and on the other hand 
the  emergence  of  Transnational  Corporations.  Regarding  the  first  element,  Andrea  Bieler 
states that “the transnationalisation of finance has led to the emergence of a fully-fledged 
global financial market. The first component of this process was the rise of financial offshore 
markets” (Bieler 2000, 19) 
The offshore markets could be understood in relation with the expansion of the banks' 
operations which depended on two types of innovation: technical
8 and structural
9. “Structural 
innovation began with the creation of offshore, relatively unregulated Eurocurrency markets 
in the 1960s, as US banks searched for ways to get round irksome (and costly) domestic 
restrictions” (Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 43). To emphasise the real impact of the 
offshore  markets,  Bieler  said  that  “between  1973  and  1984  there  was  a  huge  growth  in 
offshore markets to $1,000 billion, from levels of only $3 billion and $75 billion in 1960 and 
1970 respectively” (Bieler 2000, 20). 
The other component of the transnationalisation of finance is deeply connected with 
the financial offshore markets. I am talking here about more deregulation of money markets 
and  financial  operators,  policies  introduced  by  the  United  States.  Due  to  the  competitive 
pressure, other major financial centres of the world followed: in 1979 the British government 
abolished  the  control  of  capitalism
10, Japan followed in 1980, and then entire European 
Union,  New Zeeland,  Australia  and  Scandinavian Countries  (Helleiner  1994,  149 –166). 
“Eventually, due to the deregulation of national financial markets, the differences between 
them and offshore markets disappeared and an integrated global financial market emerged” 
(Bieler 2000, 20). Also, Bieler adds that it was not an inevitable process, but it was the result 
of governmental decisions. 
The  other  component  of  the  transnationalization  of  finance  is  the  emergence  and 
development  of  Transnational  Corporations:  “the  growth  of  transnational  corporations 
(TNCs), in numbers and size, has driven the transnational organisation of production. Their 
increasing importance is expressed in the rise of foreign direct investment (FDI)” (Bieler, 
Andreas  and  Adam  David  Morton.  Introduction:  Neo-Gramscian  Perspectives  in 
International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration in Bieler and 
Morton 2001, 4). To make a better view on the impact of transnational corporations on global 
economy and finance, I will discuss few documents of the United Nations Conferences. The 
first one, World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth, 
is  dealing  with  the  role  of  the  Transnational  Corporations  on  international  economy  and 
argues that the “increasing importance of transnational corporations in the growth process of 
developing countries arises not merely from the recent upsurge in the volume of foreign direct 
investment, but also from a number of major structural changes in the world economy which 
place transnational corporations in a central position as arbiters of the international division of 
labour”  (UNCTAD  1992,  7).  Those  changes  that  the  document  is  talking  about  are:  the 
                                                 
8 “Technical innovations have included the idea of arranging money transfers by issuing chequebooks, the use of plastic 
credit and cheque cards or the automatic, electronic transfer of funds and chequeclearing systems between banks” (Stopford, 
Strange and Henley 1991, 43). 
9 “Structural innovation means the introduction of new credit instruments or the development of new kinds of business by 
banks, such as the invention by Citibank of Certificates of Deposit in 1965 or the introduction of Money Market Funds and 
NOW accounts by Merrill Lynch in the mid-1970s” (Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 43). 
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increasing importance of the market forces, technological development, the globalization of 
industries, the emerging services world economy, the regionalization of the world economy
11. 
The best way to describe the real dimension of the Transnational Corporations impact 
is to monitor the foreign direct investment
12 (FDI). Thus, “the upward trend in world FDI 
flows set a new record in 1997: inflows grew by 19 per cent, to $400 billion, while outflows, 
after a decline in 1996, rose by 27 per cent, to reach $424 billion, the first time that the $400 
billion mark had been reached and passed. World FDI flows today are nearly twice what they 
had  been  in  1990,  and  some  sevenfold  their  volume  in  1980”  (UNCTAD  1998,  8).  The 
number of TNCs that were involved in this process since 1990 is around 35.000, as the United 
Nations Report suggest, and 150,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD 1992, 6). In this way, the 
process  of  globalisation  led  to  the  transnational  restructuring  of  social  relations.  “The 
deregulation  of  national  financial  markets  was  institutionalised  in  the  Internal  Market 
programme,  which  stated  that  all  remaining  capital  controls  of  member  states  had  to  be 
abolished by 1 July 1990. Only Greece and Portugal were given an extended period (until the 
end  of  1995)”  (Bieler,  Andreas  and  Adam  David  Morton.  Introduction:  Neo-Gramscian 
Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration 
in Bieler and Morton 2001, 5). To conclude, the significance of the European companies 
and/or TNCs increased in the field of economy and employment year after year, putting the 
European Union in the situation to change itself or to be a less competitive entity in the world 
economy. 
2.1.2. Transnationalization of production 
Robert Cox was the first one studying the transnationalization of production from a 
neo-gramscian perspective. He argues that internationalization of production has a formative 
role in the field of international relations through generating changes in the state structure and 
world order. Also, “international production expands through direct investment, whereas the 
rentier imperialism, of which Hobson and Lenin wrote, primary took the form of portfolio 
investment. With portfolio investment, control over the productive resources financed by the 
transaction passed with ownership to the borrower” (Cox, Robert. Social Forces, States, and 
World Orders in Keohane 1986, 233). Thus, one could say that using direct investment it is 
possible to achieve control in the field of production. 
In the core of this project stay, as I mentioned above, the growing number and size of 
Transnational Corporations
13. Those market forces design a new dynamic of global economy 
understood as globalisation, a term which merely refers to the intensification of economic 
                                                 
11 “1.The increasing importance of market forces-63 developing countries have liberalized their trade policy regimes since 
the beginning of the Uruguay Round and some 30 developing and Central and Eastern European countries liberalized their 
foreign direct investment regimes in 1991  alone. 2. Technology  and the shrinking of economic space—in a number of 
industries, particularly service industries which have witnessed the most dramatic explosion in foreign direct investment 
during the decade of 1980s, access to powerful computer-communication networks, owned by single firms or a group of 
firms,  is  increasingly  becoming  the  basis  of  international  transactions.  3.  The  globalization  of  industries-several  key 
industries (for example, automobiles, electron 7 ics) are becoming increasingly globalized, a process in which transnational 
corporations  integrate,  co-ordinate  and  control  cross-border  value-adding  activities.  4.  The  emerging  services  world 
economy-the new world economy is increasingly a services economy and since services are largely non-tradable (though 
tradability has been increased in some cases due to technological changes), foreign direct investment is typically crucial for 
access to efficient services. 5. The regionalization of the world economy— transnational corporations are both reacting by 
way of developing strategic responses to regional integration arrangements and influencing the nature of such arrangements” 
(UNCTAD 1992, 7-8). 
12 FDI means an investment made by a company or entity based in one country in the field of produc tion or business of 
another country through its companies or other economical entities. 
13 The difference between the multinational corporations and transnational corporations is that while the first “attempts to 
deconcentrate the production in several countries or regions, to avoid the negative impact of the trade barriers, transnational 
corporations deliberately tends towards a division of labor inside the company and expanded to the global level” (Dîrdală, 
Lucian-Dumitru. Actori în sistemul international in Miroiu and Ungureanu 2006, 53). 734    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
relations across the world. “To be sure, economics
14 were a big part of the globalization story, 
for  gigantic  compression  of  time  and  space  would  have  been  impossible  without  the 
worldwide  expansion  of  markets,  the  rise  of  transnational  corporations  (TNCs),  and  the 
intensification of economic flows across the globe” (Stager and Roy 2010, 52). 
On a similar manner, the rise of transnational corporations’ importance is indicated by 
the growing rate of foreign direct investments
15. “The significance of FDI demonstrates the 
close connection between the transnationalisation of production and finance. The deregulation 
of national currency control systems was a precondition for the free movement of capital, 
making an increased level of FDI possible” (Bieler 2000, 20-21). 
Furthermore, Bieler states that the FDI increase on its own cannot indicate the overall 
importance of the TNCs in the world economy. The best way of doing this is to compare the 
FDIs with world exports and world output. Between 1983 and 1989, world foreign-direct-
investment outflows had a 28.9% rate of annual growth, which represent three times more 
than world exports – 9.4% (UN 1991, 4). “This is further confirmed by the indicator of the 
global sales of foreign affiliates in host countries, which is better suited for the comparison 
with trade flows, since it includes the value of output of TNCs’ activities in contrast to FDI” 
(Bieler 2000, 21).  
2.1.3. Ideological shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism 
The last component of globalization is ideology. All of those changes on material level 
like commerce or technology occurred also because of some ideological assumptions that 
precisely steered the economy to liberalization and state minimization. Regarding technology, 
as I argued above using Andreas Bieler’s ideas, it could also have been used by the state to 
increase  its  power,  in  the  absence  of  neoliberal  ideology.  “The  public  interpretation  of 
globalization as a mostly economic phenomenon driven by the irreversible dynamics of the 
free market and cutting edge technology was encouraged by executives of large transnational 
corporations,  corporate  lobbyists,  prominent  journalists  and  public-relations  specialists, 
cultural  elites  and  entertainment  celebrities  –  and  political  leaders  like  Bill  Clinton  who 
articulated  their  neoliberal  agenda  within  such  a  ‘globalist’  framework”  (Stager  and  Roy 
2010,  53).  In  this  way,  globalization  is  filled  with  neoliberal  ideas  which  forge  market 
globalism across all national and cultural borders
16. 
                                                 
14 Stager and Roy argue also that “these economic developments were facilitated by the rapid transformation of information, 
communication, and transportation technology – a ‘digital revolution’ epitomized by the proliferation of personal computers, 
the Internet, satellite TV, standardized containers, fibre-optic cables, electronic barcodes, and global supply chains” (Stager 
and Roy 2010, 52). But I will follow here Andreas Bieler argument that those technologies could also have been used by the 
states to prevent transnationalisation through strengthening national controls and regulations (Bieler 2000, 19). According to 
this, a very important role is shifted to the ideological dimension, as I will explain in the next section. 
15 “The decade of the 1990s promises to be one in which foreign direct investment will play a major role in shaping world 
economic development and the structure of the international economy. Since recovering from slow growth in the early 1980s, 
global flows of foreign direct investment have increased far more rapidly than world trade and output, reaching nearly $200 
billion in 1989, for a total world stock of $1.5 trillion. Developing countries remain relatively marginalized in the rapid rise 
of global foreign-direct-investment flows: of total outflow in 1990, $163 billion were invested in developed countries and 
$30 billion in developing countries” (UN 1991, 83). 
16 To be more specific, one of the most important claims of neoliberalism regarding globalization “presents the creation of 
globally integrating markets as a rational process that furthers individual freedom and material progress in the world. The 
underlying assumption here is that markets and consumerist principles are universally applicable because they appeal to all 
(self-interested)  human  beings  regardless  of  their  social  context.  Not  even  stark  cultural  differences  should  be  seen  as 
obstacles in the establishment of a single global free market in goods, services, and capital. A related neoliberal claim states 
that the liberalization of trade and the global integration of markets will ultimately benefit all people materially” (Stager and 
Roy 2010, 53). 
Another  important  neoliberal  claim  “portrays  the  liberalization  and  global  integration  of  markets  as  inevitable  and 
irreversible, almost like some natural force such as the weather or gravity. This assertion makes it easier for neoliberals to 
convince people that they must adapt to the inherent rules of the free market if they are to survive and prosper” (Stager and 
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Following  Manfred  Stager  and  Ravi  Roy,  there  are  five  claims  of  the  market 
globalism: 
 
“Claim 1: Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets. 
Claim 2: Globalization is inevitable and irresistible. 
Claim 3: Nobody is in charge of globalization. 
Claim 4: Globalization benefits everyone (in the long run...). 
Claim 5: Globalization furthers the spread of democracy and freedom in the world” 
(Stager and Roy 2010, 54). 
 
All of those claims have also an important impact at the policy level of globalisation. 
The consequent design illustrates “a world in which the actions of governments, as well as 
firms and workers, are internally and externally disciplined by market forces, or, to put it 
differently, by the power of capital” (Gill, Stephen. Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and 
Disciplinary  Neo-Liberalism  in  Bieler  and  Morton  2001,  50).  For  example,  financial 
integration  is  limiting  the  possibility  of  a  country  to  adopt  a  policy  that  has  a  negative 
influence on the medium-term financial stability. “The disciplining effect of global financial 
and product markets applies not only to policymakers, via financial market pressures, but also 
to 7 the private sector, by making it more difficult to sustain unwarranted wage increases and 
price  markups.  Rather  than  acting  as  a  constraint  on  the  pursuit  of  appropriate  policies, 
globalization  can  provide  added  leverage  to  such  policies.  It  may  also  provide  added 
flexibility” (Dailami and Haque 1998, 7-8). The point here is that, in the end, the pressure of 
globalisation will determine national states to apply the ideological assumption to their own 
policies that are in the benefit of the transnational capital. 
The emergence of neoliberalism was a historical event that occured at the beginning of 
1980s,  due  to  the  crisis  of  Keynesianism  –  the  dominant  economic  and  social  model  of 
capitalism since the end of the Second World War. This model, known as the middle way 
between capitalism and communism
17, was characterised by a high intervention of the state on 
market, capital regulations and the stress on full employment
18. Neoliberalism re-launched the 
old principles of classical liberalism
19 and adapt them to the context of the global economy. 
Consequently, “this shift can be observed in all three major instances of regionalism: the EU, 
the North American Free Trade Area and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation” (Bieler 
2000, 22). 
Thus, in the next sections I will make a further discussion on how exactly the forces of 
globalization and neoliberal ideology worked together to shape the new face of European 
Union after Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht. But until then, I will bring into 
the  analysis  two  more  concepts  that  will  help  me  to  better  understand  the  impact  of 
globalisation: internationalization of the state and transnational historical bloc. 
2.1.4. State under globalisation and transnational historical bloc 
There are many perspectives on globalisation and also many perspectives on the nature 
of state. There are scholars talking about the twilight of state and scholars that argue for a 
process of internationalization rather than globalisation, and consequently putting the state in 
the  middle  of  this  process.  In  this  research,  I  will  assume  that  globalisation  implies  the 
reorganisation of the state-society relations. For example, neoliberalism implies the shift from 
                                                 
17 See Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. New York: 2005, p. 10. 
18 See Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. New York: 2005, pp. 10-11. 
19  “Efficiency  and  price  stability  are  the  new  priorities,  the  privatisation  of  the  state-controlled  enterprises  and  the 
liberalisation  and deregulation  of  the  economy  at  the  national  level  are  advocated,  social  peace  is  imposed  rather  than 
negotiated and there is no commitment to redistribution or social reform” (Bieler 2000, 22). 736    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Political Sciences, European Studies and IR 
 
welfare state (the age of Keynesianism) to the night watchman state. “The institutions linked 
to the global economy have become dominant
20 within the ‘political society’ and transnational 
social forces dominate important parts of the ‘civil society’ such as political parties, trade 
unions and so on. Nationalised industry is privatised, the economy in general liberalised and 
deregulated, including the labour market, and the welfare system cut back. The goal of full 
employment is replaced by low inflation and price stability” (Bieler 2000, 24). But those 
theoretical assumptions cannot be applied for all states to the same extent. There are states 
that were not welfare, and there are states that did not totally become night-watchman. The 
reality is that neoliberal restructuring has a different face in every country, but the neoliberal 
night-watchman state is seen as an ideal type that would eventually indicate the direction of 
reforms. 
Another important discussion here is about the existence of a transnational historical 
bloc, considering that Gramsci developed this concept only to be apply on a national level. 
The economic reality brought by globalisation through the internationalization of production 
rise the question if we can also talk about a historical bloc on a transnational level. Thus, 
Robert Cox identifies here two kinds of capitalist and labour organization. Regarding the 
definition of former bourgeoisie, Cox states that now we can talk about national capitalists 
and about a transnational class. The last one, that is the central point in my research, has its 
own ideology, strategy and institutions, and is also organised through Trilateral Commission, 
World Bank or International Monetary Fund
21. On the other hand, the Canadian author argues 
that the stable workers from the international production sector are likely to be the ally of the 
transnational capitalist class
22. Consequently, the nature of the transnational economy allows a 
broader discussion on the existence of a transnational historical bloc. 
Following the research of Robert Cox ,  Stephen  Gill  argues  that  “a  transnational 
historical  bloc  is  outlined,  with  its  nucleus  largely  comprising  elements  of  the  G-7  state 
apparatuses and transnational capital (in manufacturing, finance, and services), and associated 
privileged  workers  and  smaller  firms  (e.g.,  small  and  middle-sized  businesses  linked  as 
contractors  or  suppliers,  import-export  businesses,  and  service  companies,  such  as 
stockbrokers, accountants, consultancies, lobbyists, educational entrepreneurs, architects, and 
designers)” (Gill 1995, 400-401). Furthermore, the existence of a transnational historical bloc 
automatically raises the question regarding its nature, if it is or not hegemonic. The most 
relevant research here was made also by Stephen Gill who states that the historical bloc did 
not  reach  the  level  of  hegemony,  and  it  is  only  in  a  position  of  supremacy
23. A deep 
discussion on this topic is not, however, important for this article. 
2.2. Globalization and its impact on European Union 
Following Andreas Bieler definition of globalisation, one could observe that this is a 
relatively new process that characterise the structural changes the world has experienced since 
1970/1980. It involves the restructuring of states and the reconfiguration of social forces. 
“Global in its nature, this structural change has not left the EU unaffected. As elsewhere, 
globalisation has led to a transnational restructuring of social relations. The deregulation of 
national  financial  markets  was  institutionalised  in  the  Internal  Market  programme,  which 
stated that all remaining capital controls of member states had to be abolished by 1 July 1990” 
                                                 
20 The process of national policy harmonization on the behalf of globalization process appears to Cox in contradiction with 
the Keynesian model of development, specific to the previous era. “The internationalization of state gives precedence to 
certain state agencies – notably ministries of finance and prime ministers’ offices – which are key points in the adjustment of 
domestic to international economic policy” (Cox, Robert. Social Forces, States, and World Orders in Keohane 1986, 231). 
21 For more information see Cox, Robert. Social Forces, States, and World Orders in Keohane 1986, 233. 
22 For more information see Cox, Robert. Social Forces, States, and World Orders in Keohane 1986, 235. 
23 For more details see Gill, Stephen. ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, Millennium, 24: 
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(Bieler 2000, 26). Thus, in this section I will focus on the configuration of social forces at 
European level, more exactly on the activity of the European Round Table of Industrialist, 
and  on  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  as  a  structural  change  generated  by  the 
globalisation process and the pressure of ERT. 
2.2.1. European Round Table of Industrialists 
I will discuss the configuration of social forces on European level in the context of an 
existing  transnational  historical  bloc,  constituted  from  the  world’s  biggest  transnational 
corporations,  that  has  its  representation  in  Europe  through  European  Round  Table  of 
Industrialists.  The  transnational  historical  bloc  could  be  observed  in  the  context  of  the 
international policy-making apparatus that intensively collaborate with private agents: “for 
example, International Relations Councils such as the Trilateral Commission (which has a 
large EU membership, with elite political and economic interests represented), the World 
Economic Forum, the Group of Thirty (particularly important in money and finance), and 
think tanks such as the UK’s Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute, the 
American Brookings Institute and the American Enterprise Institute, as well as the fora for 
leaders of large corporations. It involves European fora associated with corporate influence on 
the making of public policy, such as the ERT which involves among its membership 20 of the 
top  100  firms  in  the  world,  according  to  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development’s World Investment Report of 1995” (Gill, Stephen. Constitutionalising Capital: 
EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism in Bieler and Morton 2001, 54). Due the globalisation 
process,  and  implicitly  due  the  trasnationalisation  of  production  and  finance,  the  world 
biggest  transnational  corporations  started  to  have  more  and  more  influence  into  the 
international policy-making process, steering it on a neoliberal road. 
Going  back  to  the  transnational  historical  bloc  basis  in  European  Union,  I  should 
mention that it includes “state interests associated with the German-dominated unification 
project,  large-scale  finance  and  productive  capital  of  global  reach,  as  well  as  European 
companies,  and  associated  privileged  workers  and  smaller  firms”  (Gill,  Stephen. 
Constitutionalising  Capital:  EMU  and  Disciplinary  Neo-Liberalism  in  Bieler  and  Morton 
2001, 54). The real impact of the big capital on European integration is going to be deeply 
discussed in the next section of the paper, when I will try to show that it was the result of the 
large firms’ pressure and it is also constituted on a neoliberal logic. Furthermore, “the concept 
of historical bloc enables us to understand how the present political formations, based on the 
dominance of transnational capital, are also constituted by and incorporate a wider range of 
interests and identities, including many privileged workers, members of the professions and 
small  business  people”  (Gill,  Stephen.  Constitutionalising  Capital:  EMU  and  Disciplinary 
Neo-Liberalism in Bieler and Morton 2001, 55). It is to say that transnational historical blocs 
include interests of both capital and labour, and they also strongly support the neoliberal 
restructuring of the European Union. 
To show how all of those things became possible, I will present now the emergence 
and the influence of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) which is considered to 
be the central point of the European reform process. Thus, “When integration was at a low-
point in  the early 1980s  and growing  global competition  threatened the position of large 
section of European industry, leading members of Europe’s business community such as Pehr 
Gyllenhammar of Volvo, Umberto Agnelli of Fiat and Wisse Dekker of Philips, began to 
perceive  the  need  for  a  European-level  political  initiative  to  recover  from  this  European 
decline”  (van  Apeldoorn  2002,  84).  This  period  when  Europe  faced  a  stagnation  of  the 
integration process, known also as the "Eurosclerosis", was overlapping with the crisis of 
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 “The trouble was that the European economy was floundering and political leaders 
did not seem to understand why. Business leaders, on the other hand, had clear and (as ever) 
simple ideas
24” (Richardson 2000, 6). At that time, the European economy was similar in size 
to the one of the United States, but it was suffering from bad policies according to global 
economic  realities  and  fragmentation
25. The ERT came as an answer to those problems 
brought by globalisation and it “developed a number of major themes to support these ideas. 
One was the need for adequate infrastructure links (roads, high speed trains and a Channel 
Tunnel) between different European countries to match the growth in cross-frontier trade and 
movement”  (Richardson  2000,  6).  Another  idea,  which  will  be  further  discussed  in  this 
article, was the building of a single internal market – like in the United States – where goods, 
capital and services can freely travel through the former borders of the member states. “A 
third was to tackle the intolerable "black cloud" of unemployment by policy measures to 
strengthen and dynamise European industry, through freeing up labour markets, raising levels 
of  skills,  encouraging  entrepreneurship  and  stimulating  an  economic  growth  rich  in  the 
creation of new jobs” (Richardson 2000, 6). This is going to be known as the neoliberal 
reform of the European Union. 
In  time,  ERT  has  developed  and  became  an  independent  and  very  influential 
organisation  recognised  by  both  European  institutions  and  member  states’  national 
governments. Nowadays, the ERT has 52 members and its president is Leif Johansson, from 
the Ericsson. Since its beginnings, around 30 years ago, the number of members didn’t grow 
too  much  which  means  that  ERT  is  still  a  select  club.  “The  membership  of  the  ERT  is 
personal, it is not companies that are members of the ERT but individuals leading companies 
– in practice always men (the ERT has not so far had any female members). The Roundtable 
is therefore not a conference of transnational corporation meeting to discuss possible forms of 
co-operation or common strategies, but a group of individual businessmen who, although they 
are  heads  of  certain  TNCs,  do  not  necessarily  represent  those  companies  within  the 
Roundtable discussions. Membership is by invitation only” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 89). Thus, 
to  achieve  membership  in  the  ERT  supposes  strong  personal  relationships  with  wider 
networks of economic elites. The selection of the members should respect a set of informal 
criteria. 
“A first criterion is that the company which the prospective members are drawn must 
be a European-based (industrial) TNC, preferably private. The prospective members should 
‘represent’ their company at the highest level, that of chairman or chief executive officer 
(CEO). The company itself should also be independent and not a subsidiary” (van Apeldoorn 
2002, 89). Besides this, the company should also have its headquarter somewhere in Europe, 
fact  which  makes  the  accession  impossible  for  the  leaders  of  many  companies  with  the 
headquarter in Unites States. Another important criterion “is that the prospective member not 
only shares the (official) objectives of the Roundtable but can make a credible commitment 
that he will contribute to the achievement of those objectives. As the membership is personal, 
the choice is also made on a basis of personal characteristics, where personality, opinions [of 
the person], capabilities and vision, all play a role” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 90). Consequently, 
the political view of each candidate has a strong importance and it should be similar with the 
one of current members. 
                                                 
24 The closure between big business and decision makers was coming from both sides. On the one hand the Europeans TNCs 
were seeing their profits threaten by the global economic realities (transnationalisation of production), and on the other hand, 
political decision makers wanted to listen to the preferences of the big companies regarding reform policies: Who do we talk 
to when we want to talk to European industry? This was the question raised by the two leading European Commissioners, 
Etienne Davignon and Fran￧ois–Xavier Ortoli (Richardson 2000, 6) which I consider very important for this research. 
25 “The European Union (to use its later title) did not function as a single economic unit, which was the  fundamental 
advantage of the US, and its economic management was out of date and in many respects counterproductive” (Richardson 
2000, 6). Mihail CARADAICĂ   739 
 
Moving forward from the structural characteristics of the ERT, I will move now to the 
nature of this entity. “Many of the 500 or more Euro-organisations represent specific business 
interests.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  these  are  sectoral  of  trade  associations”  (van 
Apeldoorn 2002, 102). Also, it must be said that in the sector of industry there are six big 
associations of business: UNICE; Eurochambres; the European Centre of Public Enterprises 
(CEEP);  the  European  Community  Services  Group;  the  EC  Committee  of  an  American 
Chamber of Commerce (Amcham); and the ERT (van Apeldoorn 2002, 102). According to 
van Apeldoorn, “the ERT takes up a unique place within this group, and indeed within the 
whole system of business interest representation” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 102). If we look also 
on the European official web site, it indicates also that the “ERT has close contacts with 
BUSINESSEUROPE, the official representative body of European business and industry vis-
￠-vis the European institutions”
26. Thereby, the European Roundtable forum is not a lobby 
group itself, but it is working through other lobby groups. 
“The agency of the ERT, then, falls neither under the logic of pluralist lobbying nor 
under that of corporatist interest intermediation. Thus whereas for instance UNICE, as a peak 
association, has a public and formal – one might say ‘corporatist’ – role to play vis-￠-vis the 
Commission  and  as  a  ‘social  partner’  in  the  dialogue  with  the  European  Trade  Union 
Confederation (ETUC), the ERT is not an interest association at all” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 
104). To be more specific, the ERT has no members to represent or to discipline, but the ERT 
is  its  members.  Thus,  van  Apeldoorn  argues  that  it  is  “neither  a  lobby  group  nor  an 
association,  but  rather  a  private  forum  for  Europe’s  transnational  capitalist  class”  (van 
Apeldoorn 2002, 101). 
The main argument here is that “because the ERT is not a formal interest association, 
but rather a relatively informal elite club of Europe’s most prominent business leaders, it can 
formulate and propagate a concept of the general (capitalist) interest, which […] is always 
formulated from the vantage point of a particular class fraction” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 106). 
It seems also very natural that capitalist interests are constructed through a business forum 
like  ERT,  where  the  leading  capitalists  come  together  and  share  ideas,  trying  to  reach  a 
common view on issues like labour or state (van Apeldoorn 2002, 106). Moreover, those 
ideas are gathered in some strategies that will become public and set the agenda of policy 
makers. Van Apeldoorn calls this a transnational class strategy. 
The ERT has different ways to communicate their ideas. “It regularly publishes reports 
either on specific themes or of a more comprehensive nature, and frequently sends letters and 
communiques to individual politicians or to collective bodies such as the European Council” 
(van Apeldoorn 2002, 113). But the most usual end efficient way to communicate is face to 
face, during the meetings between CEO’s of the ERT and decision and policy makers. The 
most important proposals regarding the European economic efficiency made by ERT were 
gathered under the issue of Competitiveness. “ERT staff worked in close liaison with the 
Commission, ERT ideas were evident in the Delors White Paper on Competitiveness, Growth 
and  Employment,  and  also  in  the  parallel  Action  Plan  issued  by  the  Brussels  European 
Council in  1993, while  the Essen European Council in  1994 formally  endorsed the ERT 
proposal for a high level Competitiveness Advisory Group with powers to lay relevant issues 
directly before heads of government as well as the President of the Commission” (Richardson 
2000, 8). Besides competitiveness, there are also other working groups that are meant to 
provide an integrated view on European economy: CFO Task Force
27, Competition Policy
28, 
                                                 
26  For  more  details,  see  Erawatch  -  Platform  on  Research  and  Innovation  policies  and  systems  on: 
http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu[...].  
27 “The ERT CFO Task Force seeks to address matters particularly in the development of financial and regulatory reporting. 
They engage with regulators including the IASB,  the European Commission and corporate groups, to address key concerns 
and to communicate to governments and regulators the positions that are  in the interest of and agreed on behalf of ERT 
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Energy & Climate Change
29, Societal Changes
30 and Trade and Market Access
31. Moreover, 
the ERT members were involved in the “debate on the proposed European Company Statute 
and  other  social  legislation,  gave  continuing  support  to  Monetary  Union,  argued  for  the 
adoption of international accounting standards, helped to launch the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue, pushed hard and in the end successfully for a world trade agreement” (Richardson 
2000, 8). 
Thus, following Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson or many other scholars, one 
could say that the ERT “played a major role in the emergence of the Single European Act 
(SEA) and the creation of the 1992 single market programme” (Mazey and Richardson 2001). 
Those reforms remain some of the most important changes that the European Community 
managed to follow because of their impact in reforming an entire continent in the next twenty 
years. “While political pundits and journalists evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of 
the 1992 project, scholars continue to wage a considerable debate over the origins of the 
single market programme and the accompanying SEA. At the core of this academic dispute is 
the question of the role played by the leaders of big business and their influence on the policy-
making process
32” (Cowles 1995, 502). 
On  the  other  hand,  van  Apeldoorn  interprets  the  re-launching  of  the  European 
integration  through  the  internal  market  programme,  Single  European  Act  and  Treaty  of 
Maastricht  in  terms  of  a  struggle  between  two  main  contenting  projects.  “The  struggle 
between  the  two  most  important  of  these  projects  –  those  of  neoliberalism  and  neo-
mercantilism – was partly manifested within the ranks of the European Roundtable, which at 
the same time also played a crucial role in shaping this struggle” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 115). 
Neo-mercantilism  was  specific  for  the  Keynesian  period  of  welfare  state  and  national 
protectionism, while neoliberalism came, as I already argued, as a component of globalisation 
process (besides transnationalisation of production and finance) and involves the economic 
liberalisation and the minimisation of the state interventionism. “Van Apeldoorn shows how 
the ERT shifted from a perspective that sought to encourage the development of European 
champions  (an  inward-looking  and  defensive  Euro-mercantilist  strategy),  to  a  more  neo-
liberal and global orientation during the 1990s. During the early 1980s, most firms that were 
the national and European ‘champions’ generally tended to perceive globalisation as a threat 
rather than as an opportunity and pressed for a relaunch of the European project on very 
different  terms  to  neo-liberals”  (Gill,  Stephen.  Constitutionalising  Capital:  EMU  and 
Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism in Bieler and Morton 2001, 53). In this context, neoliberalism 
appears to be a project of globally-oriented finance and industrial capital that is certainly 
going to benefit from globalisation, rather than a project of the European companies who 
produce for the European markets. 
                                                                                                                                                         
28 “ERT believes that globalisation, rapid technological change and market dynamism are intensifying competition in EU 
markets and worldwide. EU competition policy, which is central to the proper functioning of the internal market, should 
therefore be adopted to the global economy, and made fit for dynamic markets” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups). 
29 “The Energy and Climate Change Working Group seeks to create a holistic approach appropriate to the international 
context to address the significant challenges that Europe and the planet are confronting” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups). 
30 “The Societal Changes Working Group is focused on issues that pertain to Europe’s greatest resource: its people.  The 
future of Europe and its industries depends on the workforce of today and tomorrow” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups). 
31  “ERT  believes  that  open  international  flows  of  trade  and  investment  are  a  crucial  component  in  ensuring  European 
companies’  competitiveness  in  a  global  economy;  and  necessary  for  achieving  balanced  global  growth.  The  Trade  and 
Market  Access  Working  Group  focuses  on  the  prospect  of  a  Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment  Partnership” 
(http://www.ert.eu/working_groups). 
32 “Reshaping Europe had much to say on the details of the "competitive market place" and the infrastructure needed for 
business efficiency. It emphasised the two–way relationship: "Europe needs its industries...but industry also needs Europe", 
and  it  boldly  mapped  out  a  comprehensive  timetable  for  Monetary  Union  at  a  time  when  decision  makers  were  still 
hesitating” (Richardson 2000, 7). Mihail CARADAICĂ   741 
 
2.2.2. European Monetary Union 
European integration can neither be simply derived from structural developments nor 
from highly abstract concepts and ideas developed at the drawing table. Instead, it takes place 
as a ‘succession of negotiated settlements’ (Bieling 2003, 206). In this section I will try to 
argue that, considering the pressure of the ERT through lobby activity and policy initiatives, 
that Maastricht reforms and the Economic and Monetary Union are encompassed into the 
neoliberal discourse. It means that EMU is a result of the globalisation pressure on the one 
hand, and a specific political project developed by the decision makers in collaboration with 
representative of European big capital (ERT) on the other. 
Moreover, Stephen Gill’s suggestion is to see EMU in the context of economic global 
regionalisation which is a phenomena that can also be seen in North America or East Asia. 
“Thus it is important to place EMU (and other liberalization measures in the EU) in the 
context of global patterns of power and production, as aspects of the political economy of 
globalisation.  The  emerging  accumulation  patterns  are  linked  to  the  rising  power  of 
internationally  mobile  capital”  (Gill,  Stephen.  Constitutionalising  Capital:  EMU  and 
Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism in Bieler and Morton 2001, 48-49). This is just a tendency of 
capitalism system to centralise and concentrate capital that has been observed and predicted 
even by Karl Marx in the second half of the nineteen century. Thus, the Maastricht reforms 
were a political reaction in front of all this developments. “They seek to institutionalise a new 
currency  and  mandate  strict  fiscal  discipline  as  part  of  the  new  practices  of  economic 
governance that will give credibility to governments and confidence to investors. It is part of 
an expansion of state activity to provide greater legal and other protections for business, and 
to  try  to  stabilise  the  investment  climate  in  Europe
33”  (Gill,  Stephen.  Constitutionalising 
Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism in Bieler and Morton 2001, 49). 
For Christoph Hermann, the EMU is one of the most obvious and clear manifestation 
of neoliberal  reforms at the European level. “While the SEA guarantees “free” trade and 
capital mobility within Europe, the EMU fortifies the principles of monetary restraint and 
budgetary  austerity  by  forcing  EMU  member  states  in  to  a  tight  fiscal  corset.  […]  The 
budgetary  constraints  imposed  by  the  convergence  criteria  also  compel  member  states  to 
introduce  far-reaching  reforms  in  labour  and  social  policies  as  their  ability  to  confront 
unemployment  and  social  exclusion  is  severely  limited  by  the  lack  of  budgetary  funds” 
(Hermann  2007,  14-15).  Besides  the  national  level,  the  European  Commission  is  also 
promoting price stability and fiscal austerity in the name of economic growth. 
The neoliberal design of EMU was well express by the Thomas Palley, who discusses 
it from a Keynesian point of view and states that the neoliberal reforms were the core of the 
nowadays  European  financial  crisis.  He  argues  that  “the  flawed  European-wide  policy 
concerns  the  neoliberal  labour  market  and  macroeconomic  policy  strategy  that  has  been 
persistently promoted since the early 1980s. The flawed German policy concerns Germany’s 
reliance  on  export-led  growth  based  on  domestic  wage  suppression.  The  combination  of 
flawed policy plus flawed design explains how the crisis came about; why existing policy has 
been incapable of addressing the crisis; and why the future promises on-going economic crisis 
absent reform of the eurozone’s economic policy configuration and monetary architecture” 
(Palley 2013, 31). Furthermore, the neoliberal dimension could be seen in the convergence 
criteria to the eurozeone, which are macroeconomic indicators measuring price stability (to 
see if the inflation is under control), soundness and sustainability of public finances (to check 
the limits on government borrowing and national debt to avoid excessive deficit), exchange-
                                                 
33 Also, “European governments have sought to expand the scope of free enterprise as the primary motor of accumulation, 
and to de-socialise risk provision. In this way they are changing the institutional balance between state and civil society (e.g., 
through privatisation in pensions, health, education)” (Gill, Stephen. Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-
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rate stability and long-term interest rates (to assess the durability of the convergence achieved 
by fulfilling the other criteria)
34. Thus, “fiscal consolidation for the purpose of meeting the 
Maastricht  convergence  criteria  was  largely  achieved  through  reduced  interest  payments, 
caused by reduced risk premiums that could be ‘imported’ to previous high inflation countries 
from the low inflation countries in the EMU core through the common currency backed by the 
credibility  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact
35”  (Ryner,  Magnus.  Neoliberal  European 
Governance  and  the  Politics  of  Welfare  State  Retrenchment:  A  Critique  of  the  New 
Malthusians in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 50). 
Turning  back  to  Stephen  Gill,  he  named  the  European  political  economy  as  an 
Achilles’  heel  due  the  effects  of  the  neoliberal  monetarist  austerity  policies:  mass 
unemployment.  “Concentrated  heavily  among  younger  and  less  skilled  workers,  it  partly 
explains tough immigration and asylum policies and, at least for the movement of (most) 
people,  a  ‘fortress  Europe’.  It  contributes  to  a  potent  admixture  of  social  and  economic 
dislocation,  physical  risks,  racism  and  xenophobia”  (Gill,  Stephen.  Constitutionalising 
Capital:  EMU  and  Disciplinary  Neo-Liberalism  in  Bieler  and  Morton  2001,  48). 
Consequently,  the  EMU  reforms  designed  a  Europe  for  the  TNCs,  where  the  economic 
freedom stays in front of the social protection of the citizens. 
3. Conclusions 
What is the relation between globalization and the process of European integration? 
Does European integration have its own way, or it is deeply dependent on globalization? 
Those are the research questions that I tried to follow in this article, and I tried to answer them 
by discussing the European integration from a neo-gramscian perspective and then, by finding 
a proper definition for the concept  of  globalisation.  What  I  found out  was  that the most 
important component of the neo-gramscian approach was their focus on the social forces 
agency. Social forces were no more than faction of the social classes that couldn’t reach a 
high level of cohesion not even in nowadays society. Moreover, economic realities of the 
present, show a high degree a capital concentration on global level, so we can talk about 
transnational social forces, which are in fact Transnational Corporations that operate on a 
global scale. The fact that we can use social forces in analysing European integration means 
that we could encompass also the globalisation process. 
Furthermore, I understood globalisation, following Andreas Bieler and Robert Cox, as 
a process of transnationalisation of production, transnationalisation of finance and the shift 
from  Keynesianism  to  neoliberalism.  Consequently,  production  and  finance  are  deeply 
connected with the activity of the TNCs, while neoliberal ideology works at the hegemonic 
level. People begin to perceive the neoliberal economic reality as the only possible reality that 
works for the benefit of all. Thereby, those forces engendered by the globalisation process 
achieved a certain level of cohesion at the European level and form the European Round 
Table of Industrialists – a forum where the capitalist class strategy is formed. Going forward 
with  my  research,  I  found  out  that  the  ERT  had  a  very  important  role  in  the  reforming 
European Union through the Single European Act, Treaty of Maastricht and Economic and 
Monetary  Union.  In  the  end,  I  focused  on  the  EMU  and  I  showed  how  its  institutional 
architecture and policies outputs were encompassed in the neoliberal perspective. 
                                                 
34European  Commission.  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs:  .http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ 
finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm. 
35 “This even had positive demand side-effects via decreasing interest rates. In addition, fiscal consolidation was largely 
secured on the revenue side. True, corporate taxation rates and employers’ contributions were reduced. However, tighter 
writeoff rules for corporate taxes, and the switching from payroll surcharges to general taxation, increased the tax base” 
(Ryner, Magnus. Neoliberal European Governance and the Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Critique of the New 
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To  conclude,  the  processes  of  globalisation  and  European  Integration  are  deeply 
connected and represent, in neo-gramscian terms, both the tendency of capital concentration 
and the influence of the neoliberal ideology. Thus, due the economic and ideological reasons, 
European integration follows the same path as globalisation and seems to be, for the regular 
citizen, impossible to control through the representative democracy. 
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